星期一, 3月 09, 2009

壽險公司目前面對的困境

人壽保險公司靠什麼賺錢? 不是靠同客戶對賭生命的長短, 或者發生意外的機會, 其實人壽保險公司主要的盈利來源是靠運用客戶的保費以及存款投資賺取收益. 因此, 股市, 債市以及利率對壽險公司影響很大. 投資市場的表現主宰壽險公司的盈利以及股價. 由於09年至今環球股市繼續大跌, 預期宏利需要進一步增加segregated fund guarantee的reserves, 利率持續低企損害新保費投資以及到期再投資的收益, 可以預期宏利第一季的業績都唔會好.

多謝網友neo的留言, 以下的文章對壽險公司目前面對的困境講解得很好, 值得一看.

http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=50723

LIFECO EARNINGS HAMMERED by Tom Slee

The economic tsunami has claimed another industry. Canadian lifecos, for years regarded as "recession proof", hit a brick wall in the fourth quarter. Results were terrible, far worse than anticipated. All of the major players were battered as plunging markets stripped away their reserves and inflicted serious losses.

Flagship Manulife Financial was hardest hit. CEO Dominic D'Alessandro has admitted that his segregated fund and annuity contracts are now $26 billion under water. That is about as bad as it gets! No wonder the leading credit agencies downgraded Sun Life and Manulife.

For almost 10 years, ever since the industry was demutualized, the leading Canadian life insurance companies were a success story. They gobbled up smaller competitors, rationalized the industry, and successfully expanded abroad. Canadian morbidity and mortality rates improved, earnings grew, and the companies generated excess capital. So when the downturn loomed I looked to this sector as one of our shelters. In fact, as you know, I thought lifecos would weather the storm better than the banks. That has not been the case. Great West Life's shares fell 58% from their high. Sun Life dropped 64% and Manulife plunged a staggering 70%, closing last week below $10. It's a disaster area!

What went wrong? How could a tightly regulated industry, based on strength and security, a supposedly defensive sector, seriously underperform in a market downturn? The main reason, I think, is that since going public the lifecos have became more performance driven and gradually changed their product mix. Segregated funds, variable annuities, and wealth management offered better profit margins than conventional life insurance. So they became the name of the game. There was only one problem. This new business thrust was priced and dependant on above-average investment returns. So the lifecos were forced to manage their portfolios more aggressively. Long-term government bonds, the insurance industry's stock in trade, were no longer going to do the trick and managers turned to the stock market and more esoteric securities.

Consequently, when disaster struck, the insurance companies were hit on several fronts. Sharply lower stock prices required large reserve increases to support the now exposed segregated funds and guaranteed annuities. At the same time, many fixed-income investments became impaired or devalued and had to be written down because of the mark-to-market rules. To make matters worse, interest rates have remained stubbornly low, as money poured into the bond market driving prices higher. This, in turn, squeezed the lifecos' margins on new policies. Even established business was hurt by the low rates. Canadian insurers are well matched with blocks of long-term fixed assets offsetting life insurance liabilities but low interest rates create a reinvestment problem and trigger additional reserve requirements.

In short, the stock market collapse and downgrading of fixed-income securities, primarily due to the subprime fiasco, created a perfect storm and undermined the Canadian lifecos. All the tight regulations, competent management, and normal safeguards were swept away and there was very little that the companies could do. As I have mentioned before, this market crash was widespread as well as deep. There was no place to hide. Good investment managers, and Sun and Manulife are acknowledged to be some of the best in the business, suffered along with everybody else. The only salvation was to vacate the markets altogether and that was never an option. Life insurance is about investing premiums and using the resulting income to pay claims. That is how it works. Insurance companies would go broke if they liquidated their portfolios and sat on huge amounts of cash for a year or so.

Looking ahead, we have a bit of a conundrum. Normally in a recession companies report lower earnings and disappointed investors drive their stocks lower. The shares recover when results improve. In the case of lifecos, though, the market itself is determining their earnings, a market, incidentally, that their own slumping stocks are helping to depress. For example, Great West and Manulife reported strong profitable sales in the fourth quarter but that did very little for their bottom lines. Yet it has been estimated that any meaningful increase in stock prices, say to the December 2007 levels, would allow Manulife to release $5.3 billion in segregated fund reserves and cause earnings to spring back by more than $2 a share. Great West and Sun are in the same boat. That means any recommendation concerning Sun Life Financial, Industrial Alliance (TSX: IAG), and Manulife, all currently on our Buy list, is really a call on the market itself.

My feeling is that all of these excellent companies will not only survive but do well in 2010 and beyond. Manulife, for example, is already on the acquisition trail. Earnings are going to fluctuate but gradually improve as markets recover. Nevertheless, lifeco stocks are likely to lag. Seared by the financial sector collapse, investors will almost certainly shy away from insurers for a while, especially now that their earnings quality is suspect. We could also see lifecos issuing more stock to bolster capital and meet regulatory requirements and that will hurt the share prices.

Therefore, I am putting Manulife, Sun, and Industrial Alliance on Hold. They are so depressed that there is likely to be some rebound but I would not accumulate them for long-term growth at this stage. Specific updates on each company follow.

後記: 目前無論匯豐或宏利都面對困難的金融以及經濟環境, 投資者要考慮的是目前歐美金融業面對的是週期性還是結構性的問題, 如果認為是結構性, 那麼就沽清匯豐宏利離埸或者換至其他行業, 如果是週期性, 那麼現時持有甚至在資金仍然非常充裕的情況下增持金融業的強者是很好的時機, 筆者當然認為目前的問題只是週期性, 而匯豐和宏利絕對會是風暴過去後的強者, 因此會繼續持有手上全部金融股, 不過由於要增加現金儲備, 因此短期內也不會增持, 月供股票除外

台灣yahoo: http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/mr-market/

新浪Sina: http://graham_choi2003.mysinablog.com/

香港yahoo: http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/mr-market/

20 則留言:

  1. Dear Mr market,

    The HSBC is still worth to hold or continue to buy and comparing with 945, which one is better hold?

    Do you feel disappointed and astonishing for their performance? if between 945 & 5, i will choose 945, if i have surplus money, what is your choose between them?

    Best regards.

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  2. Dear Mr. Market,

    I would like to tell you that if you ignore the market, you will get punished. Hope you can learn a lesson at this time.

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  3. 先生: 第一次留言, 請教..金融股, 如何分析問題是週期性or結構性? Thks

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  4. 現在的市況,真的不知何時會出現不可預計的風險 !

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  5. 市場先生,

    很多大型銀行因参與大花筒賭局而弄致破產或財困, 而你竟然還說這是週期性問題, 不知你是天才或是白痴(無意人身攻擊, 只因無法理解).

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  6. This HSBC lesson teaches you how to diversify. One basket with a few similar eggs won't do you any good.

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  7. Dear Mr. Market

    I understand your views. But it is indeed difficult to explain your stances given that we are really punished in the short run. Given there is no need to cash in within 10 years, is it a big deal to hold some HSBC now? I still feel comfortable about my holdings of HSBC and Manulfie.

    Nevertheless, I feel disappointed by the way that HSBC handled the crisis.

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  8. I very much agree with 劉兆祥
    --------------------------------

    劉兆祥: 匯控<00005.HK>有七宗罪

    第一:最初說不用供股,由內部資源可處理問題,結果仍要供股

    第二:盈利大跌卻沒有發出盈利警告訊號

    第三:以超出投資者預期的大比例供股,12供5股,供股價28元

    第四:12供5,使大部份人士的股份手數變為碎股,而12供5後,以400股來說,究竟投資者可供的數目是多少,連中央過戶處與匯控本身也出現分歧,這種不清晰情況使投資者感覺混亂,中央過戶處說是165股,而匯控則說是166股呢?(以12股計,投資者持有一手,得出33.33,究竟小數點的數字應否計入作供股之用,其實匯控本身的計算有錯誤,理論上12供5的話,供股權的尾數一定是5或零,因此未來有頗多的爭吵)

    第五:匯控在3月12日除供股權,但在3月18日則除息(每股$0.78),但匯控宣布新供股的投資者沒有股息收入,問題是匯控股價除淨時要將股價調整,假設除息時是33元,除息日股價便是$32.22,使匯控市值變相減少39億元,即供股部份便會帶來損失

    第六:匯控預期09年首三季都會派發8美仙股息($0.624港元,三季合供需1.872),但大家都問一個問題,是匯控今年會否見紅,如果確保有這樣高的股息收入呢?

    第七:也是匯控股價大跌的原因,就是之前外資大行不斷看淡股價及前景,不排除這些大外之前已經大手沽空,但今次匯控仍然由他們做包銷,使他們可輕易回補空倉盤,更重要是他們有更多的彈藥來大手拋空匯控,慢慢才補回,使股價跌完可以再跌,如果今次匯控能事前與中央溝通,讓中資機構取得一半的包銷數量(到時供股比例可能較目前優勝,例如3供1,每股30元),除了得到中國祝福外,最重要是早前拋空的大戶,知道不可能透過供股來取得股份,便只能在市場買貨,恐怕單是這些補倉盤,已經可以將匯控股價推上60元之上。

    可惜匯控管理層一連串的錯誤,使投資者損失慘重,而最重要是反映目前匯控處於當黑期,如果是好運期,這些事一定不會發生,但當行衰運時,便會頭頭踫著黑。

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  9. What analysis you have done to conclude that the current situation in HSBC is 週期性 instead of 結構性? It sounds to me very religious if you conclude something based on pure belief.

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  10. 這個風暴導致多間大行倒閉,如果說不是結構性,實在有點不合情理!

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  11. http://linshaoyangblog.blog.163.com/blog/static/10578221420092100404332/
    覆市場先生 2009-03-10 00:40
    分类:默认分类 字号: 大大 中中 小小 多謝先生厚愛, 刊登本人的文章在閣下網站. 客氣說話不多說, 相信大家亦不必由財務學ABC講起. 只想跟你說, 我用的同樣是你的公式, Assets = Equity + Liabilities, 但得出的結論剛好相反.

    不錯, 如果股本作出調整, 資產必須同步調整, 但是 200-300 億元的資產變化, 對總資產影響只是少數後那丁點的小水點, 改變不了財務比率嚴重失衡的事實. 按照你的邏輯, 正因為負債(Liabilities) 為定量, 那才得人驚, 因為如果資產總值實際不是 25,xxx 億, 而是 24,000 億, 相差不足 4%, 按照目前市場波幅指標, 碎料而已, 但你認為股本結果會是多少? 記住, 結算單位是美元, 不是港元. 而今次集資所得, 只是區區的 177 億.

    不錯, 槓桿比率高低不足以證明一家銀行經營是否穩健, 還要看其持有的資產質素而定, 然而, 誰能判斷匯控的資產質素是好是壞? AAA評級的債券都可以一天之內違約. 匯控仍然有600億的美國毒債, 英國的資產仍勢將繼續惡化. 槓桿比率雖有不足, 卻是計算資產價值可容許出錯的客觀基準, 用你的方法, 則非假設你有上帝"全知"的能力不成. 過往銀行槓桿比率一般都在10-15倍之間, 近年才突然之間瘋狂上升, 而且間間銀行的資產負債表的資產一欄都有水份, 令實際比率比表面的比率更高. 以匯控去年底的比率為例, 扣除商譽及無形資產, 比率不是25倍而是35倍. 如果這樣仍然叫財政健全, 請恕我少見多怪.

    作為香港人, 有誰想匯豐衰? 匯豐出問題, 我們每個人都會有問題. 因此, 昨日收市競價時段出現的混亂局面, 亦令人大感意外, 必須查明真相, 如果證明有人操控市場, 有必要嚴正對待, 以維持香港金融市場的健全及完整. 我們做分析的, 感情歸感情, 事實還事實, 即使我們感性上如何不希望那是事實, 看見問題不可以當沒有事發生.

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  12. No one can tell you whether it is 週期性 or 結構性。You can just gamble on it

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  13. Thank you for your sharing:)

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  14. 先生, 林少陽回應0左你

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  15. 我就從來希望匯豐同宏利快d 過左e 個困難時期,
    起碼佢地真係一間好公司,
    年年派息都可以派得咁好.

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  16. I told all the die-hard fans of 945 that they should have sold their stocks before $100 (I sold all my 945 at $105). Now, everybody knows why! I do not intend to scare you but the price of 945 will drop sharply before June. Good luck!

    As for HSBC, I also expressed a view that "If you support HK, you should support HSBC!" I remember someone said that my idea is ridiculous. I would say this guy is too naive and does not know the whole economic situation of Hong Kong well. Anyway, I hope that guy can learn more about economics before doing anything about stocks.

    As for Mr. Market, I think he should sell 945 now! Keep some cash for your future! An economics war is coming!

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  17. 市場先生,本人不懂得怎樣去衝量一個股票的價值,只知道匯豐和宏利都已經跌到慘不忍睹,是否長線投資已死?要更改為審度時勢的投資?本人有很多疑問,長線投資是否一定好?世上並沒有永久持有的股票?如果我們在歷史新高的匯豐價格153.5元全沽了,可惜到現在不知道什麼時候再可以到達這個價格?如果到了這個價格,中間損失了多久的時間值呢?有一樣東西我一定知道的,就是股市就是『估市』,無人知道將來會發生什麼。

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  18. segregated fund reserves 看來未來的幾年仍要增加

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  19. The shares recover when results improve. In the case of lifecos, though, the market itself is determining their earnings, A market, incidentally, that their own slumping stocks are helping to depress.

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