1) 宏利金融宣布，將發行800萬股(最多可增加至1,100萬股)系列4優先股(Series 4 Preferred shares), 每股定價為25加元, 首5年固定年利率6.6厘, 不可累積(non-cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 6.60% annually), 集資2億加元(800萬股), 最多則集資2.75億加元(1,100萬股). 5年後可轉為浮息系列5優先股(Series 5 Preferred shares). 集資目的為增加一級資本 (Tier one capital), 以強化資產負債表.
筆者認為唔需要反應過敏. 事實上, 過去幾年, 宏利每隔一段時間都會發行優先股.
例如, 2003年6月19日, 宏利發行1,400萬股系列1優先股(Series 1 Preferred shares), 每股定價為25加元, 年利率4.1厘, 不可累積, 集資3.5億加元.
2005年2月18日, 宏利發行1,400萬股系列2優先股(Series 2 Preferred shares), 每股定價為25加元, 年利率4.65厘, 不可累積, 集資3.5億加元.
2006年1月13, 宏利發行1,200萬股系列3優先股(Series 3 Preferred shares), 每股定價為25加元, 年利率4.5厘, 不可累積, 集資3億加元.
今次集資金額只有2.75億加元, 相對宏利Total Equity 274.55億加元, 只是1%, 影響很微, 而且嚴格來講, 優先股是debt, 不影響普通股東權益(common equity).
2) 評級機構標準普爾發表報告，下調宏利金融交易對手信貸評級至「ＡＡ－」，旗下各家經營保險業務的主要附屬公司之長期交易對手信貸評級及財務實力評級則被降至「ＡＡ＋」，評級展望為「穩定」。
All of these operating insurance companies (The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., John Hancock Life Insurance Co., John Hancock Life Insurance Co. U.S.A., Manulife International Ltd., and Manulife Life Insurance Co. Ltd. collectively known as Manulife) now have long-term counterparty credit and financial strength ratings of 'AA+'. The counterparty credit rating on Manulife Financial is 'AA-'. The outlook is stable.
報告指，宏利盈利及資金方面的不穩定性增加，令其原有的「ＡＡＡ」評級不能維持，環球股市下挫並持續動盪，影響集團盈利、儲備、資本金以至借貸，削弱集團財務彈性，相信未來１２至１８個月，環球股票及信貸市場會令集團重要的財富管理業務費用收入下滑，對沖及借貸成本上升，以及令投資組合價值進一步受壓。
In our opinion, the downgrade reflects the decline and ongoing volatility of the global equity markets, the resultant impact on earnings, reserves, capital and financial leverage, and the company's reduced level of financial flexibility.
Currently, equity markets are down almost halfway from their peak in the major markets where Manulife competes. While we believe that Manulife Financial has done relatively well managing itself through an equity market tail event, we believe the increased earnings and capital volatility are not consistent with the previous 'AAA' rating.
We also expect the deterioration within the global equity and credit markets to lead to a decline in fee revenues from the group's significant wealth management businesses, an increase in hedging and borrowing cost, and continued pressure on the investment portfolio over the next 12-18 months.
We believe that much of the earnings pressure from Manulife's wealth management operations will be tempered by the underlying strength and diversity of the company's earnings base, which includes large blocks of more stable protection businesses. Our rating action is a part of our ongoing review of the insurance industry in a deteriorating economy.
不過標普稱，由於預期宏利今年除稅後核心經營溢利可維持逾３５億加幣，因此予其「穩定」展望，但倘有任何證據顯示目前看法有誤，或環球股市會出現持續且深遠的跌市，宏利評級展望則可能被降至「負面」。
The stable outlook reflects our view that the group's still-substantial financial flexibility is commensurate with the current rating level. The outlook also reflects our expectation that the core after-tax operating earnings will remain above C$3.5 billion on a normal run rate basis in 2009, fixed charge on a core operating earnings basis will remain above 10x, asset quality issues will be less significant than those of its North American peers, and reserve requirements for equity risk will not cause capital at the operating companies to fall below the 'AA' level as measured by our capital models.
We expect that we could revise the outlook to negative if there is any evidence of deterioration in one or more of the above metrics, or if the global equity markets remain in a deep and prolonged decline.
兩則新聞以宏利失去AAA最高信用評級影響較大, 對宏利的資金成本有負面影響. 之前宏利努力左10年才收復AAA的評級, 今次失去的確可惜, 又要努力很多年. 幸好, 標準普爾認為宏利的評級不會低於AA, 因為世界各國通常只接受「A-」的長期相應信用評級的保險企業資產納入監管機構的資本計算標準, 所以宏利仍然相當安全. (註: 2628國壽的長期本幣交易對手信用評級為A+).
最後重申, 筆者仍然持有2400股宏利, 信心不會因為股價下跌而改變, 對宏利的盈利前景仍然樂觀.
台灣yahoo: http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/mr-market/
新浪Sina: http://graham_choi2003.mysinablog.com/
香港yahoo: http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/mr-market/
Even if your analysis is so positive, you cannot stop the sliding price of 945. The main reason is that in the crazy bear market, anything worse can happen again and again!
回覆刪除Don't treat Tony's book as an investment bible anymore!
To disappointed fan of 945:
回覆刪除If 945 as you say it is not worth to be invested. What stocks do you suggest. or just holding cash.
為什麼不買平的MFC,而要買貴的945?
回覆刪除其中一樣毒藥又出現，商業按揭債券，究竟宏利有沒有持有？
回覆刪除我清楚宏利無直接持有CDS。但有無可能知道佢有無間接持有，如持有其他公司的股權而間接持有CDS？
優先股與公司債券都是公司舉債的方法,請問當中有甚麼不同?謝謝!
回覆刪除市場先生: 究竟宏利跌到 89 ,仲抵唔抵買啊?
回覆刪除你係買美股宏利? 定港股宏利啊?
同埋你覺得宜家應唔應買入匯豐銀行呢?
樓上那位咩, 叫做 MFC 啊?
我响今日hkd90.3買回一半早前hkd123沽出之宏利, 餘下我應唔應该等香港同美國之間之差價再缩小先至買?
回覆刪除MFC=MANULIFE FINancial CORP, 在USA上市之编号.
回覆刪除回應史提芬周 : 因為我的美股戶口仍未搞掂, 唔能夠買賣.
回覆刪除回應Tom: 優先股與公司債券有唔少分別, 其中一樣, 當清算(liquidation)時, 債券持有人的權利先過優先股的持有人.
回應風險大師, 黑杰克 : 現價無論945或MFC都抵買, 如果折讓大, 當然是買MFC抵d.
To Anonymous,
回覆刪除Like you, I used to be the one who kept asking the so-called "experts" to give me "the number". But this kind of laziness can't help you get rich! Do more homework to find out potential stocks by yourself if you want to earn more money in the stock market, especially in this crazy bear market! Please be reminded that the bear likes eating your money!
但係點解每隔一兩年都發優先股呢 ?
回覆刪除我同意宏利是不錯的股票, 但不用心緊, 不用現在全身投入, 月供也好, 2個月買一次也好, 可能會再跌, 升也不會是一, 兩天的事, 不要受別人影響.
回覆刪除To Manfred,
回覆刪除You said "我同意宏利是不錯的股票, 但不用心緊, 不用現在全身投入, 月供也好, 2個月買一次也好, 可能會再跌, 升也不會是一, 兩天的事, 不要受別人影響."
Manulife "was" a good stock, but in what sense do you still think it "is" a good stock in this crazy bear market where the storm happens in the financial sector?
You said "不要受別人影響", I hope other people will not be influenced by your speech; otherwise, they will lose most of their money soon!
Can you see the second tsunami is coming? Probably not!
好野, 945依家58蚊... 我會聽市場先生講, 入返十手八手...
回覆刪除http://www.gurufocus.com/news.php?id=50723
回覆刪除We welcome back contributing editor Tom Slee who this week offers his views on why the life insurance companies, which he knows well having worked in the industry for many years, have turned out to be less recession-proof than expected. Here is his report:
Tom Slee writes:
The economic tsunami has claimed another industry. Canadian lifecos, for years regarded as "recession proof", hit a brick wall in the fourth quarter. Results were terrible, far worse than anticipated. All of the major players were battered as plunging markets stripped away their reserves and inflicted serious losses.
Flagship Manulife Financial was hardest hit. CEO Dominic D'Alessandro has admitted that his segregated fund and annuity contracts are now $26 billion under water. That is about as bad as it gets! No wonder the leading credit agencies downgraded Sun Life and Manulife.
For almost 10 years, ever since the industry was demutualized, the leading Canadian life insurance companies were a success story. They gobbled up smaller competitors, rationalized the industry, and successfully expanded abroad. Canadian morbidity and mortality rates improved, earnings grew, and the companies generated excess capital. So when the downturn loomed I looked to this sector as one of our shelters. In fact, as you know, I thought lifecos would weather the storm better than the banks. That has not been the case. Great West Life's shares fell 58% from their high. Sun Life dropped 64% and Manulife plunged a staggering 70%, closing last week below $10. It's a disaster area!
What went wrong? How could a tightly regulated industry, based on strength and security, a supposedly defensive sector, seriously underperform in a market downturn? The main reason, I think, is that since going public the lifecos have became more performance driven and gradually changed their product mix. Segregated funds, variable annuities, and wealth management offered better profit margins than conventional life insurance. So they became the name of the game. There was only one problem. This new business thrust was priced and dependant on above-average investment returns. So the lifecos were forced to manage their portfolios more aggressively. Long-term government bonds, the insurance industry's stock in trade, were no longer going to do the trick and managers turned to the stock market and more esoteric securities.
Consequently, when disaster struck, the insurance companies were hit on several fronts. Sharply lower stock prices required large reserve increases to support the now exposed segregated funds and guaranteed annuities. At the same time, many fixed-income investments became impaired or devalued and had to be written down because of the mark-to-market rules. To make matters worse, interest rates have remained stubbornly low, as money poured into the bond market driving prices higher. This, in turn, squeezed the lifecos' margins on new policies. Even established business was hurt by the low rates. Canadian insurers are well matched with blocks of long-term fixed assets offsetting life insurance liabilities but low interest rates create a reinvestment problem and trigger additional reserve requirements.
In short, the stock market collapse and downgrading of fixed-income securities, primarily due to the subprime fiasco, created a perfect storm and undermined the Canadian lifecos. All the tight regulations, competent management, and normal safeguards were swept away and there was very little that the companies could do. As I have mentioned before, this market crash was widespread as well as deep. There was no place to hide. Good investment managers, and Sun and Manulife are acknowledged to be some of the best in the business, suffered along with everybody else. The only salvation was to vacate the markets altogether and that was never an option. Life insurance is about investing premiums and using the resulting income to pay claims. That is how it works. Insurance companies would go broke if they liquidated their portfolios and sat on huge amounts of cash for a year or so.
Looking ahead, we have a bit of a conundrum. Normally in a recession companies report lower earnings and disappointed investors drive their stocks lower. The shares recover when results improve. In the case of lifecos, though, the market itself is determining their earnings, a market, incidentally, that their own slumping stocks are helping to depress. For example, Great West and Manulife reported strong profitable sales in the fourth quarter but that did very little for their bottom lines. Yet it has been estimated that any meaningful increase in stock prices, say to the December 2007 levels, would allow Manulife to release $5.3 billion in segregated fund reserves and cause earnings to spring back by more than $2 a share. Great West and Sun are in the same boat. That means any recommendation concerning Sun Life Financial, Industrial Alliance (TSX: IAG), and Manulife, all currently on our Buy list, is really a call on the market itself.
My feeling is that all of these excellent companies will not only survive but do well in 2010 and beyond. Manulife, for example, is already on the acquisition trail. Earnings are going to fluctuate but gradually improve as markets recover. Nevertheless, lifeco stocks are likely to lag. Seared by the financial sector collapse, investors will almost certainly shy away from insurers for a while, especially now that their earnings quality is suspect. We could also see lifecos issuing more stock to bolster capital and meet regulatory requirements and that will hurt the share prices.
Therefore, I am putting Manulife, Sun, and Industrial Alliance on Hold. They are so depressed that there is likely to be some rebound but I would not accumulate them for long-term growth at this stage. Specific updates on each company follow.